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I. INTRODUCTION
The future of international climate change regulation remains uncertain, as nations struggle to prepare an agreement that will govern obligations post-Kyoto Protocol. The negotiations at COP-15 at Copenhagen1
revealed deep political divisions and demonstrated the changing power dynamics in international relations, COP-16 negotiations in Cancun2 restored
what appeared to be a derailed international process and COP-17 negotiations at Durban signaled continuing differences among nations to making
emissions reduction an obligation, as three major signatories to the Kyoto
Protocol—Canada, Japan, and Russia—refused to commit to a second round
of emissions reduction obligations.3 Climate negotiations thus continue to
expose the continuing crisis in international law. Despite efforts of several
nations, many even sincere, it is becoming clear that the chronic illness—of


Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. The author is grateful
to the organizers at the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, the editors of Case Western International Law Journal and particularly to Professor Michael Scharf for hosting an
intellectually invigorating conference.
1
See generally Copenhagen Climate Change Conference - December 2009, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/
meeting/6295.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (providing background information on the
COP-15 conference).
2
See generally U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: BUREAU FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY,
SYNTHESIS OF UNFCCC CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE IN CANCUN, MEXICO (2010) (providing a summary of COP-16 in Cancun).
3
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for
Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, 16th Sess., 6, Draft Decision-/CMP-7 (advance
unedited version), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/
application/pdf/awgkp_outcome.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012); Jennifer Morgan & Edward
Cameron, Reflections on COP 17 in Durban, WORLD RESOURCES INST. INSIGHTS (Dec. 16,
2011), http://insights.wri.org/news/2011/12/reflections-cop-17-durban.
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poor international law response to environmental and human rights issues—
is now approaching crisis proportions in the context of climate change. This
thought piece identifies three overlapping areas of crises: normative, economic order, and legitimacy. It argues that hope, the theme of this panel, in
averting a crisis relating to climate change lies in embracing the need for a
moral compass in addressing this incredibly complex collective action problem.
II. THE THREE CRISES
International legal response to climate change is at crossroads and
the way is scattered with several problems and pitfalls. There are, however,
three core crises that challenge the efficacy of international law and can
potentially exacerbate the international law crisis.
A.

Normative Crisis

Climate change threatens to devastate several nations, threatening
their territorial integrity and domestic sustenance. For example, rising sea
levels are predicted to eventually drown the Maldives.4 Similarly, severe
and sudden weather conditions are predicted to devastate populations and
property in Bangladesh.5 Both Maldives and Bangladesh are sovereign nations and recognized as such by their membership in the United Nations. 6
As sovereign nations, international law implicitly and customarily recognizes their right to exercise full control over their domestic affairs.7
Their territorial integrity and the property and livelihood of their
people are domestic concerns. Nations such as Maldives and Bangladesh are
entitled under international law and the founding principle of sovereignty to
exercise full control over these matters. However, when their domestic interest in their territory and their people is wrecked by climate impacts
caused primarily by activities of foreign nations,8 their sovereignty is chal-

4

ORRIN H. PILKEY & ROB YOUNG, THE RISING SEA 20 (2009) (discussing the construction
of a massive sea wall around Male, the capital city of the Maldives, to combat the heightened
risk of flooding).
5
E.g., MD. SHAMSUDDOHA & REZAUL KARIM CHOWDHURY, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT
AND DISASTER VULNERABILITIES IN THE COASTAL AREAS OF BANGLADESH 10–17 (2007) (explaining how natural disasters and rising sea levels could negatively impact Bangladesh by
causing loss of lives and property).
6
Press Release, Dep’t of Pub. Info., United Nations Member States, U.N. Press Release
ORG/1469 (July 3, 2006) (listing the 192 Member States of the United Nations).
7
See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 11–22 (1999) (explaining the history of the different types of sovereignty).
8
See, e.g., Adam Hadhazy, The Maldives, Threatened by Drowning Due to Climate
Change, Set to Go Carbon-Neutral, SCI. AM. (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.
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lenged. Further, to the extent that they cannot—through internal measures—
mitigate the problem, their ability to exercise their sovereign prerogatives
has been compromised. To the extent their influence in the international
arena is limited for lack of economic prowess, their ability to control factors
and mitigate their loss of sovereignty is further diminished. The fate of nations such as Maldives and Bangladesh and their people lies in the hands of
a few developed countries and emerging economies.
To date, the process of globalization notwithstanding, nations may
not interfere with another nation’s sovereignty, unless the nation chooses to
abdicate its sovereignty on its own volition.9 Globalization may have lowered national borders, but it has not eradicated these borders. So, when one
considers the situation regarding sovereignty as it stands presently, it is evident that respect for sovereignty, per the Westphalian pact, 10 must be extended to all nations recognized by the community of nations.
The tone of international negotiations on climate change, however,
underplays the threat that climate change presents to national sovereignty of
these nations. In this sense, climate change showcases the normative threat
to a fundamental precept of international law. It challenges the international
process underlying climate change negotiations.
B.

Economic Interest Crisis

A second crisis stems from the current global economic order. The
end of the Cold War and the emergence of a global economic order through
a series of trade and investment liberalization agreements has resulted in the
emergence of new economies, Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa (in combination referred to as BRIC or BASIC). While there are mixed
views about the emergence of these economies and their general impact on
local economies and social conditions, those issues are not discussed here.
The focus here is on the ultimate consequence of the emergence of these

com/blog/post.cfm?id=maldives-drowning-carbon-neutral-by-2009-03-16 (noting that because of the fear of rising sea levels, the Maldives plan to go carbon-neutral).
9
See, e.g., Ruwantissa Abeyratne, What Really Is State Sovereignty?, Sri Lanka Guardian
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2011/10/what-really-is-state-sovereignty.
html ( “Sovereignty in international law is the right to exercise the functions of a State to the
exclusion of all other States in regard to a certain area of the world.”).
10
See Jan Aart Scholte, Civil Society and Sovereignty in a Post-Statist Circumstance, in
RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA? 331, 345 (Trudy Jacobsen et al.
eds., 2008) (explaining how the Westphalian Pact enabled democratic sovereign states to
guarantee their democratic credentials); Daniel Philpott, Westphalia, Authority, and International Society, in SOVEREIGNTY AT THE MILLENNIUM 144, 160 (Robert Jackson ed., 3rd ed.
1999) (“Westphalia remains the most significant resolution in sovereignty to date. It revised
all three facets of authority, and established constitutional authority in the form of the sovereign states system.”).
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nations as key players in the global economy on climate change negotiations.
Since these nations are shaping their economies on highly carbonintensive growth models, since their historic contribution to emissions is
low, and since they are unwilling to sacrifice their opportunity for development, the essence of climate negotiations lies in balancing economic interests of nations. Developed countries have been focused therefore on finding
solutions that will strike the delicate balance between economic interests
and interests in mitigating climate change. To be sure, climate change—if
unmitigated—can also affect economic interests, but instead of motivating
action, mixed evaluations have resulted in some nations resisting emissions
reduction obligations, instead of increased efforts to reduce emissions. Notably, larger emitters such as China and the U.S. have resisted binding emissions obligations.11
The influence of such economic self-interest on international legal
obligations mirrors the problems of another era of “globalization,” when the
influence of the British Empire spanned the globe.12 Nations now, as then,
are focused on the economic and power-related aspects, sometimes to the
detriment of their own citizens. At the height of the British Empire, not only
was there unrest in Britain’s colonies, but, in Britain, there were those that
also lost their employment and thus did not benefit from the Empire’s economic growth.13
The current quest for economic growth by emerging economies
overshadows other equally important human interests, even in their own
countries. For example, India is an emerging economy whose citizens are
consistently listed among the most vulnerable populations to climate change
impacts.14 Yet the Indian government is pursuing policies that favor economic growth and non-legal intervention in its climate policies over other
property and livelihood-related interests of its citizens.15 More generally,
11

Peter H. Koehn, Underneath Kyoto: Emerging Subnational Government Initiatives and
Incipient Issue-Bundling Opportunities in China and the United States, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL.
POLITICS 53, 55 (2008).
12
See generally 4 EDGAR SANDERSON, THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
(London, Blackie & Son, Ltd. 1897) (providing a history of the lives of British citizens
around the world during the 1800s).
13
See 1 id. at 222 (London, Blackie & Son, Ltd. 1897) (describing the food shortages
affecting British citizens in Canada before and during the colonization period).
14
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries, 20–24 (2007) (noting that
India is susceptible to flooding, erosion, mudslides and epidemics of malaria, dengue, and
other vector-borne diseases during the wet season).
15
See Namrata Patodia Rastogi, Winds of Change: India’s Emerging Climate Strategy, 46
INT’L SPECTATOR 127, 127 (2011) (shifting climate policies in India must not be implemented at the expense of economic growth and development).
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polices pursued by emerging economies and developed countries generally
present near-insurmountable problems to other nations, particularly in the
sub-Saharan region.
C.

Legitimacy Crisis: Climate Change and Adaptation Strategies

The third crisis lies in the legitimacy of international response to
climate change, particularly with respect to adaptation. The question of legitimacy in international law scholarship has received considerable attention
in different contexts. Legitimacy is seen as an essential component of international law, as a reason why nations comply with international law16 and as
a tool to increase the efficacy of international organizations.17
Whatever view one takes of legitimacy, there is presently a legitimacy crisis with respect to climate change, which is particularly evident in
efforts to fund mitigation and adaptation efforts. In an effort to assist developing nations to adapt to climate change and to collect related data, negotiators established a series of financial mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol,
which was operationalized in later meetings.18 The disbursement of these
funds, however, falls short of legitimacy standards for several reasons.
First, the structure for allocating funds is complex, and barring least
developed countries, the allocation for developing countries is checkered.19
Second, the disbursement of funds is governed by multilateral banks, which
has resulted in conflict regarding rules governing disbursement and poor
participation by the recipient nation in the project selection process.20 Thus,
rather than countries identifying projects and receiving funds, donor institutions select projects and countries.21 Third, international organizations that
16
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 712
(1988) (describing how the components of legitimacy influence states).
17
See Daniel M. Bodansky, The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law 2 (Univ.
Georgia Sch. Law, Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-013, 2008), available at http://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1033542##.
18
E.g., Adaptation Fund, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_
mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/3659.php (last updated Dec. 21, 2011) (describing the
establishment of the Adaptation Fund, an important financial mechanism supervised and
managed by the Adaptation Fund Board, with the purpose to review submission requests for
funding).
19
See generally Adaptation Fund Board, Initial Funding Priorities, Nov. 16–18, 2009,
U.N. Doc. AFB/B.8/7/Rev.1 (Oct. 29, 2009) (listing the Adaptation Fund’s goals for resource allocation decisions).
20
See generally INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., TRUST FUND SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT: AN
EVALUATION OF THE WORLD BANK’S TRUST FUND PORTFOLIO 110 (2011) (outlining the ways
the World Bank serves the Global Environment Facility (GEF)).
21
See, e.g., Adaptation Fund Board, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support
/financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/4264.php (last updated Apr. 4, 2011) (listing
the functions of the Adaptation Fund Board).

File: Badrinarayana 2

440

Created on: 4/3/2012 9:47:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:18:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:435

disburse the funds, such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), have
applied their own governing rules for providing aid and therefore, required
developing nations to propose projects that bear “global benefits” and not
only “local benefits.”22 Such requirements are prima facie illegitimate,23
especially when one considers that these countries are paying the price for a
problem that was caused by a few countries that were pursuing developing
activities for their national benefit. Fourth, even though nations recently
pledged $100 billion per year starting in 2020, for both mitigation and adaptation activities, it is unclear whether and how these nations are going to
meet their goals.24
To be fair, since the COP-16 meeting in Cancun and the COP-17
meeting in Durban, efforts are underway to reduce discrepancies in the financing system. A special committee, comprised of developing countries’
representatives, that was established at COP-16 to create a more transparent
system for fund disbursement25 provided its first report in Durban.26 The
governance mechanism, however, requires fine-tuning. Even if a more
transparent and balanced system is eventually established, the management
of internal problems, such as corruption and unaccountable domestic administration of funds, will require close international scrutiny.
Missteps in the generation and administration of vast amounts of
funds will mean further weakening of legitimacy of the international legal
order governing climate change. This legitimacy concern represents a looming crisis, because failure to properly manage funds could devastate nations—both donors and recipients—even if for different reasons.
III. CONCLUSION
The three crises discussed briefly in this thought piece can be meaningfully addressed by nations. However, to do so, nations must consider the
fundamental purpose of not only international law, but law itself. Even if
22

See Nicholas Van Praag, The Global Environment Facility: Instrument Establishing, 33
I.L.M. 1273, 1286 (1994) (outlining the way funds are allocated and trustee responsibilities);
see also Sophie Smyth, Collective Action For Development Finance, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
961, 993 (addressing NGO concerns with the World Bank’s role in financing projects).
23
DEV. CTR. OF THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., FINANCING DEVELOPMENT
2008: WHOSE OWNERSHIP? 12 (2008) (“[E]xternally imposed democratic processes may be
regarded as an illegitimate interference by donors in national affairs.”).
24
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group
on Climate Change Financing 3, U.N. Doc. 10-63081 (Nov. 5, 2010).
25
See RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCING: THE GREEN
CLIMATE FUND (GCF) 6 (2011) (stipulating the terms of the formation of the Transitional
Committee).
26
Green Climate Fund, Rep. of the Transitional Committee, 17th Sess., annex II, Draft
decision-/CP.17 (advanced unedited version) (on file with author).
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technically and mechanically achievable, the separation of morality from
law is in many ways central to the present crisis in international law regarding climate change. If one is to hope that crises will provide opportunities to
be innovative and courageous, one must equally hope that at least a loose
sense of justice enters the negotiations.
By not carefully considering the different interests of citizens in
discussing emissions reductions, states have obscured the impact of fundamentally changed nature of this global society in addressing global collective problems. Disparities within nations are now echoed across nations—
winners and losers can be found both in developed and developing nations.
Thus, even if a few wealthy countries may have contributed to the problem
initially, not all citizens within developed countries engage in highly carbon-intensive activities. Similarly, not all citizens in emerging economies
pursue a low-carbon intensive lifestyle. These disparities call for more innovative solutions within the domestic context and must be supported
through international efforts. At this point, if one has to be hopeful about the
role of international law in addressing climate change, one must be guided
as much by moral compunctions as by any other alleged self-interest.

